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The experimental and conceptual contributions of Santiago Ramón y Cajal remain almost
as fresh and valuable as when his original proposals were published more than a century
ago—a rare example, contrasting with other related sciences. His basic concepts on the
neuron as the main building block of the central nervous system, the dynamic polarization
principle as a way to understand how neurons deal with ongoing active processes,
and brain local structural arrangements as a result of the functional specialization of
selected neural circuits are concepts still surviving in present research papers dealing
with brain function during the performance of cognitive and/or behavioral activities. What
is more, the central dogma of the Neuroscience of today, i.e., brain plasticity as the
morpho-functional substrate of memory and learning processes, was already proposed
and documented with notable insights by Ramón y Cajal. From this background, I will
try to discuss in this chapter which new functional and structural concepts have been
introduced in contemporary Neuroscience and how we will be able to construct a set of
basic principles underlying brain functions for the twenty-first century.
Keywords: Ramón y Cajal, neural sciences, neural functional laws and principles, neural plasticity and elasticity,
higher brain functions
A Man of Laws and Principles
‘‘The reason of the unreason with which my reason is afflicted so weakens my reason
that with reason I murmur . . .’’
—Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote of La Mancha
There are two main ways to increase the size and scope of a given science, and from that
perspective Neuroscience is no exception. The easier one is to develop a new instrument (electron
microscope, patch-clamp, functional magnetic resonance imaging) capable of providing original
data impossible to obtain with existing devices. More difficult is to provide new conceptual and
fruitful insights aimed at illuminating the core of the selected science, opening new approaches and
pathways to advance it to still-unknown regions. In accordance with the title of this short review of
Santiago Ramón y Cajal’s contributions to the development of modern Neuroscience, present-day
neuroscientists are not particularly characterized by their ability to generate general principles
capable of supporting and assimilating the large amount of experimental data collected during the
past century (Delgado-García, 2006, 2011).
Besides his experimental contributions to the proper visualization and description of
the cellular composition of the nervous tissue, Ramón y Cajal was a man of laws and
principles, always ready to find and to propose the conceptual networks supporting and
integrating his experimental findings. For example, Ramón y Cajal (1923) summarizes the
four laws governing the morphology and connectivity of nerve cells as follows: (a) axons
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terminate in free ends; (b) axons lean against somas or
dendrites; (c) somas and dendrites also participate in nerve
impulses; and (d) those impulses are transmitted across those
protoplasmic contacts. Making a comparison with the electrical
instrumentation available in his time, Ramón y Cajal imagines
that neural transmission takes place in the same way as current
transmitted in the connections of electric components by a sort
of induction, as in the coils of the same name.
Impressively, the first chapter of his Textura del sistema
nervioso (1899) is full of principles relevant to the general
design and evolution of the nervous systems of invertebrates and
vertebrates. In the fifth chapter of that book, Ramón y Cajal
describes another three laws fundamental in the organization of
all nervous systems: (a) law of economy of time, by which neural
pathways are as short as possible, adopting imaginative geometric
solutions to this aim; (b) law of economy of matter, explaining
why some axons are originated from somas or principal dendrites
depending on their optimal location with relation to their
projecting sites; and (c) law of economy of space, according to
which neuronal somas and their protrusions are arranged in such
a way as to avoid empty spaces around them. Finally, in chapter
XLVIII of the above-mentioned book, Ramón y Cajal describes
a series of functional postulates implied in the organization of
cortical centers and pathways: (a) unity of spatial and tonal
perception, referring to the cognitive need to generate a single
and integrated perception corresponding to the whole set of
stimuli present in the external world; (b) concentric symmetries,
predicting in some ways the existence of cortical maps, mainly
for two important sensory (visual and auditory) modalities; and
(c) the already described laws of space and protoplasmic savings.
An additional law proposed by Ramón y Cajal has, like many
other of his proposed conceptual generalizations, important
functional implications: the law of the nervous avalanche or
volley (Llinás, 2003). The conduction of nerve impulses in the
form of volleys allows the simultaneous activation of numerous
neural populations from a single sensory stimulus; among other
functional advantages, this enables the generation of appropriate
functional responses from neural sites located far away from the
stimulated site.
The Enigmatic Arrows in Ramón y Cajal’s
Drawings
From my modest point of view, the three fundamental
contributions of Ramón y Cajal to past and present Neuroscience
are his exhaustive description of the morphology and
connectivity of the nerve cells, the proposal of neurons as
the building blocks of every brain, and the principle of dynamic
polarization. In this section I will address my comments to that
functional principle. In his Recuerdos (1923), Ramón y Cajal
writes that this dynamic polarization principle was developed
initially in 1891. In accordance with additional findings and
critical comments, the principle was further developed in the
so-called theory of axipetal (orthodromic) polarization.
For Ramón y Cajal, the transmission of the nerve impulse
takes place from the protoplasmic branches (i.e., the dendrites)
to the neuronal body (i.e., the soma), and from this to the
nervous expansion (i.e., to the axon). While dendrites and the
soma represent a receptive device, the axon is the organ for
transmission and distribution of neural messages. Ramón y Cajal
developed his dynamic polarization principle from his detailed
reconstructions of the (organized) cellular structure of the
cerebellar cortex (Figure 1), but he successfully applied the same
principle to many other neural circuits, such as, for example, to
the interaction of sensory signals with motor commands in the
cerebral cortex. He predicted that the centrifugal movement of
voluntary motor commands transmitted across the two motor
neurons (i.e., the projecting pyramidal cell and the motoneuron)
to the skeletal muscles is originated in the dendrites of the
pyramidal cells—that is, in the outer cortical layers, a cortical area
receiving afferent sensitive, callosal, and other association fibers.
FIGURE 1 | Movement of the nerve impulse across the cerebellar circuit, according to Santiago Ramón y Cajal. (A) An illustration of the direction and
sense of the nerve impulse arriving along mossy fibers (A) at the granule cells (a) and from these, along the parallel fibers (b), at the Golgi (c) and the Purkinje (d) cells.
The nerve impulse leaves the cerebral cortical circuit along Purkinje cell axons (B). (B) Another view of the cerebellar cortical circuit including basket cells (b) and
climbing fibers (C). Taken from Ramón y Cajal, Textura del sistema nervioso del hombre y de los animales (1899–1904).
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More than one hundred and twenty years after the seminal
proposal by Ramón y Cajal, it is still difficult to explain how
he was able to imagine the correct arrangement (direction and
sense) of arrows included in his reconstructions of cortical and
subcortical circuits. Indeed, to generate a dynamic principle for
a dead and fixed tissue is (besides a contradiction) a genial
interpretation of what one can see. Even now, it is difficult
to imagine this orderly functional organization when looking
through a microscope at a Golgi preparation of the cerebellar
or the hippocampal cortices. Interestingly, with his functional
proposal Ramón y Cajal not only was close to explaining the
unidirectional character of chemical synapses, but also offered
the background for the proper interpretation of many neural
circuits from a functional point of view.
This linear and two-dimensional model of neuronal
organization and functioning still has many followers and
still underlies our current concepts of brain activities during
complex functions such as learning and memory processes.
Furthermore, Ramón y Cajal makes important suggestions
about the functional role played by cortical short-axon neurons
in cognitive, emotional, and related functions as opposed to
those played by long-axon (projecting) neurons more related
to sensory perception or to the execution of motor commands.
The concept of reverberant circuits put forward by Lorente de
Nó (1938) can be considered another attempt at advancing the
functional consequences of the dynamic polarization principle
and overturn this interpretation of the brain as a garden
of intertwining paths. Today, people studying complex and
distributed cerebral functions such as sleep and awareness
(Hobson and Friston, 2012), or neuronal functioning during the
actual acquisition of new motor and cognitive abilities (Delgado-
García and Gruart, 2006; Gruart et al., 2015), have realized
that these functional cerebral states require an interpretation
different to (although not necessarily more complex than!) those
proposed by Ramón y Cajal many years ago.
On the basis of the seminal studies of Hamburger and Levi-
Montalcini (1949), as well as on those carried out by so many
others (see Hamburger, 1980; Levi-Montalcini et al., 1996), it is
now possible to propose a (new) trophic polarization principle.
This principle indicates the dependence of neurons in the adult
mammalian brain on molecular (?) signals generated by their
target neurons, and makes reference to the maintenance of
neuronal connections and the survival of interconnected neurons
in the adult brain (Delgado-García and Gruart, 2004). In this
way, whereas the concept of dynamic polarization suggests a
flux of nervous information from dendrites and soma towards
axon terminals, the concept of trophic polarization means an
antidromic flux of information from the neuronal target, across
the axon, toward the soma of the innervating neuron.
Nuclei vs. Cortices
In the very first chapter of his Textura (1989), Ramón y Cajal
explains that the evolution of the nervous system leads to a
functional specialization, which is latterly transformed into a
morphological redefinition. As an expected result of the laws
of time-, space-, and matter-saving it is logical that neurons
carrying out similar functions pack together, forming nuclei. A
coherent consequence of this principle is that the firing rate (FR)
of a motoneuron located in a brainstem motor center can be
representative of the firing activities of the other thousands of
neurons located in the same nucleus (Delgado-García, 2011).
The mammal abducens (ABD) nucleus is a good example
of this proposal. This nucleus contains motoneurons (Mns)
and internuclear interneurons (Int)—the first projecting to the
extraocular lateral rectus muscle and the second projecting to
the contralateral medial rectus subdivision of the oculomotor
nucleus. Anyone following the evolution of these two groups
of neurons in vertebrates will notice that in parallel with the
progressive displacement of the two eyes to a frontal position,
enabling a binocular vision, the two types of neuron approach
progressively their somas in the pons as already determined
in different species of mammals (Cabrera et al., 1993). Finally,
these two types of neuron are perfectly intermingled in primates,
constituting the ABD nucleus, where they share vestibular,
reticular, and many other afferents to the nucleus (Figure 2;
Escudero and Delgado-García, 1988).
Thus, as a functional consequence of the above contentions,
we can generalize a principle by which neurons that are together
in a nucleus fire under similar physiological rules. But, can
we say the same for neurons packed together in layers? In
this case, it is more than possible that the FR of a given
Purkinje cell, or of a pyramidal neuron, is generated with a
functional pattern different to the one shown by nearby neurons.
When dealing with cortices, the functional consequences of
this characteristic neuronal organization are not so evident.
Nevertheless, the main contribution to advance the physiological
rules of cortical arrangement was probably the concept of
functional cortical column put forward initially by Mountcastle
(1957), and later followed by many others (see Hubel andWiesel,
1977).
Ramón y Cajal suggested that the appearance of the pyramidal
cell enables the proper storage of sensory perceptions recollected
from the external world in the form of ideas and volitions. In
fact, in some of his early writings, Ramón y Cajal qualified the
pyramidal cell as the psychic neuron, a concept that he seems
later to have abandoned (López-Piñero, 2000; Goldman-Rakic,
2002). In any case, thanks to this specialized type of neuron, the
perceived sensory events do not need to be immediately (and
automatically) transformed into a motor response, but can be
retained indefinitely by pyramidal cells, mainly by those located
in association areas of the cerebral cortex. This information,
stored in the form of memories in cortical cells, can be used later
in the presence of new physical and/or social contingencies. For
Ramón y Cajal, cortical association areas play an interconnection
role between the more-specialized primary sensory and motor
areas. It is possible that the peculiar organization of cortical
circuits explains the difficulties for the proper identification of
the functional codes of specific cortical sites—i.e., functional
codes are modified moment by moment in accordance with the
ongoing internal functional needs depending on the external
constraints. According to Ramón y Cajal, the extension and
structural complexity of the cortical gray layer are intimately
related with the hierarchical psychological range of every
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FIGURE 2 | Firing rate (FR), antidromic activation, and averaged field potentials induced by short-lead excitatory (EBN) and inhibitory burst neurons
(IBN), and by ipsi- and contralateral vestibular (Vi, Vc) and prepositus (Phi, PHc) neurons projecting to the abducens (ABD) nucleus. Recordings were
carried out in alert cats. (A,B) Neuronal activity recorded from the illustrated neurons during spontaneous saccades in the on- and off-direction, respectively.
(C) Antidromic all-or-none activation of recorded neurons by microstimulation of the ABD nucleus. Arrow-heads indicate the beginning of the stimulus. (D) Average of
field potentials recorded in the ABD nucleus triggered (arrow) by these identified neurons. Abbreviations: EP and EV, horizontal eye position and velocity; FR. The
discharge rate, antidromic identification from their projecting sites, and field potential induced by ABD motoneurons (Mns) and internuclear neurons (Int) are also
shown. Taken with permission from Escudero and Delgado-García (1988).
vertebrate. More comments on this point are offered in the
following section.
Long Axons and Short Minds
Apparently, Ramón y Cajal did not like the distinction made
by Golgi between sensory and motor neurons. In contrast, and
as another example of his insightful generalizations, he divided
nerve cells into those presenting short axons, branched and
restricted inside the gray matter of the cortex, and those of
long axons, constituting the white matter, bundles, and nerves
(De Castro, 1981). Whereas it seemed clear for Ramón y Cajal
that long-axon cells take care of rapidly sending sensory or
motor messages far away in the peripheral and central nervous
systems, he wondered about the reason for the presence of so
many short-axon neurons interposed in, or collateral to the
main neural pathways (Figure 3). Almost at the end of his
Recuerdos (1923), Ramón y Cajal suggests that the functional
excellence of the human brain is intimately related to the
enormous abundance in number and in different structural
displays of the so-called short-axon neurons. Indeed, short-
axon neurons are mainly located in structures not immediately
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FIGURE 3 | Ramón y Cajal’s diagrams illustrating long-axon and short-axon neurons. (A) Direction and sense of conscious motor commands and sensory
signals in the nervous system. The diagram illustrates the cerebral cortical psychomotor region (A), the spinal cord (C), the muscle fibers (C), and the spinal ganglion
(D). Motor commands descend by the pyramidal cell axons (a) which make contact with motoneuron dendrites (b). In turn, motoneuron axons terminate on the
muscle fibers of their corresponding motor unit. Sensory signals arrive from peripheral receptors (d), and across the dorsal root (c) and the ascending tract (e) reach
second-order neurons (f), which project to cerebral cortical neurons (g), where Ramón y Cajal assumes that they make contact with the protoplasmic branches
(dendrites) of pyramidal cells. (B) An illustration of the twists and turns followed by axonal afferents to the dentate gyrus (DG) across short-axon neurons. (A) afferent
fiber; (B), short-axon neuron terminating around the somas of granule cells (C); (D), another type of short-axon neuron; b, c, d, different branches of the afferent
fiber. Taken from Ramón y Cajal, Textura del sistema nervioso del hombre y de los animales (1899–1904).
related to the generation of reflex responses, such as the
cerebral cortex, the striatum, the thalamus, or the optic lobes.
These short-axon neurons would act (in a still-unknown way)
as peculiar stores for the psychic energy, being responsible
for higher functions such as memory, ideation, and decision-
making. In contrast, long-axon neurons would take care of the
more bureaucratic role of carrying sensory information to the
corresponding cortical sites, or motor commands to peripheral
effectors.
Throughout his writings, Ramón y Cajal appears to
be conscious of the extreme difficulties in proposing an
architectonic and dynamic plan of the cerebral cortex able to
explain mental functions. As he says, the cerebral cortex is like
a forest in which many researchers have got lost. Indeed, he
expects that future neuronal engineers will be the ones finding
the proper pathways in this dense forest, an expectation not
yet fulfilled. At least Ramón y Cajal realized that complex
cognitive functions should be the result of the combined actions
of a large number of commemorative cortical primary and
secondary areas. Indeed, the cortex receives a huge amount of
selective sensory information, allowing not only an appropriate
internal representation of the external world, but also the internal
design of appropriate motor responses. Years later, Llinás (1988)
describes the same ideas in some more-contemporary words:
‘‘the mind is a computational state of the brain generated by
the interaction between the external world and internal set of
reference frames’’. Never was knight so honored by his followers!
For his proposal of the putative roles of short-axon
interneurons, Ramón y Cajal did not take into consideration
the existence of inhibitory neurons, usually located in the
circuits collateral to the main neuronal pathways that he drew
with his habitual precision (Sotelo, 2003). Interestingly, some
contemporaries of Ramón y Cajal were already aware of the
presence of active inhibitory mechanisms in the brain of
animals—as for example in the description by Pavlov (1927) of
habituation as an active inhibitory process. Also, Freud (1895),
in one of his early books (Project for a scientific psychology),
proposes the concept of repression as an active inhibition of
psychic energy, including a rather elementary scheme of brain
circuitry: when this psychic energy is actively prevented from
following a given neural pathway, it has to be redirected to other
neural sites. In this way, the psychic energy is understood as a
quantifiable entity. It is a pity that even today nobody has been
able to put coefficients to this metaphoric form of energy, a fact
contrasting with the remarks made in the following section.
A Still-Unstated Principle
In my opinion, there is an important part of cerebral functions
that can currently be understood with no major difficulties.
Indeed, motor functions can be reasonably explained with the
help of I. Newton’s second law (i.e., acceleration is produced
when a force acts on a mass). This proposal was fruitfully
developed in the past 50 years by Robinson (1981) and his
followers, up to convincingly explaining the intrinsic neural
organization of the extraocular motor system (Delgado-García,
2000). From an evolutionary point of view, it can be proposed
that brains were originated by the need for movement at a certain
speed in a three-dimensional world in which vertebrate bodies
have to move against gravitational forces, and also have to deal
with the viscous and elastic components of the external physical
elements (see Llinás, 1988).
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It is remarkable that all written contributions from Ramón
y Cajal are always illuminated by the dynamic contributions
of his cellular and histological findings (Sotelo, 2003). In this
regard, and in the light of the many different morphological
types of neuron described in his Textura (1899–1904), how is it
possible that neither Ramón y Cajal nor any of his contemporary
colleagues raised the issue of this huge morphological diversity?
What is that for? For example, Purkinje cells are quite different
from the other four (or five) types of neuron present in
the cerebellar cortex. In turn, those cortical cerebellar cells
are noticeably different in shape and dimension from those
located in the cerebral cortex, in the thalamus, or in the
brainstem. All of us can readily agree that every neuronal type
exhibits specific physiognomic profiles (De Castro, 1981), but
what about their functional peculiarities? What about their
physiology? Today, we can describe without much difficulty
the physiology of the motoneuron: a specialized type of neural
cell encoding the current length of the innervated muscle and
the speed with which this length is modified. Perhaps we can
also explain the physiology of retinal rods and cones as their
capability to transduce a given band of the electromagnetic
spectrum into biopotentials. What is not so easy is to offer
similar synthetic functional descriptions formost central nervous
system cells. What could be the physiology of inferior olive
cells, of reticular, thalamic or pyramidal neurons, and even
of the most complex known neuron, the Purkinje cell? More
experimental approaches, ranging from immunohistochemistry
to patch-clamp and from the precise determination of expressed
constitutive and functional proteins to the presence of selective
membrane receptors and related molecular elements, do not
necessarily contribute to a better understanding of the functional
reason why a given neuronal type needs to be right where it
appears.
In any case, it seems convenient to start the outline of
a new functional principle that we could initially refer to as
the transformation principle. It is clear that the different ionic
conductances present in the available neuronal types confer on
them quite diverse functional properties. The different neural
types across a neural pathway (i.e., visual, auditory, motor,
etc.) were classically considered passive relay points in the
transmission of sensory percepts or motor commands. However,
it seems reasonable to propose that every neural type present
in a given pathway or circuit plays a specific and unique role.
This uniqueness is dependent on their electrogenic and secretory
properties, at the same time that the latter are dependent on the
ionic conductances present in the plasmatic membrane and/or
on the types of protein expressed inside the neuron. In this
way, the nervous system cannot be considered a huge set of
an enormous amount of neural elements capable of detecting
sensory signals and of switching them into motor commands,
but better as a distributed structure able to transform the
incoming information from sensory receptors in an autonomous
and highly organized internal world, not necessarily dependent
on the external milieu. This internal milieu generated by the
activity of hundreds of different types of neuron is capable
of producing original decisions not necessarily contingent
on external demands. It should be expected that a different
functional state would correspond to each of the many different
functional capabilities of the set of different neuronal types
composing a brain (Figure 4). In accordance, each neuronal type
described by Ramón y Cajal must have its own physiology. We
need only to identify them.
The Game is Between Plastics and Elastics
Were the brain as plastic as many contemporary neuroscientists
seem to think, it would not be necessary to revisit the Textura
(1899–1904), because neurons illustrated in the text would no
longer exist. Nevertheless, Ramón y Cajal (1905) might be
included in the plastic group—for example when he proposes
that interneuronal connectivity, besides its hereditary origins, is
susceptible to being influenced and modified during youthful
years by education and habits. In fact, Ramón y Cajal was
certainly influenced by the proposals of Tanzi (1983) and
many others, regarding the motility of dendritic protrusions,
including their spines, and that of axon terminals. Ramón y
Cajal suggests that such motility might be dependent on the use
of the involved neuronal connections, a fact obviously related
with the psychomotor activities (such as sleep, memory, and
thinking) of the subject. These thought-provoking proposals
still survive among contemporary neuroscientists (Kandel, 1998,
1999; Albright et al., 2000; Yuste and Bonhoeffer, 2001; Sotelo,
2003). In consequence, either sleep processes (in Ramón y
Cajal’s time) or learning and memory phenomena (in ours) are
explained not on the basis of the intrinsic properties of neuronal
circuitry, but on its capability of being modified. However,
A. Von Kölliker (a contemporary of Ramón y Cajal) raised
some concerns; he realized that while psychic processes are
fairly stable in the same subject, amoeboid changes in neuronal
connections are continuous and disorganized, mostly related to
nutritional and thermal phenomena. Indeed, neurons and glial
cells are capable of a certain motility (Ramón y Cajal, 1899–1904;
Bonhoeffer and Yuste, 2002); the point is how to establish
proper causal relationships between conformational changes in
neuronal connectivity and adaptivemodifications in the behavior
and mental status of the subject. Ramón y Cajal envisages
that some changes in neuronal connectivity (lazy connections,
partial disconnections of commemorative systems) could be the
substrate for selective neural pathologies. In other words, neural
plastic changes will not always be beneficial for the supporting
individual!
Assuming that plastic changes are those that remain for long
periods of time, the concept of neural plasticity is not applicable
to the regeneration of nervous tissue after a lesion. In such
case, it would be better to talk of elasticity—i.e., a mechanism
allowing the return to the preceding state. Peripheral nerve
regrowth after a section is a well-known example of this notion.
Another example is the retraction effect of both tetanus and
botulinum neurotoxins on presynaptic axons terminating on the
infected motoneuron (Pastor et al., 1997). Once the neurotoxic
effects are over, all of the presynaptic terminals (a few thousand
for a motoneuron!) return to the postsynaptic membrane in
a similar proportion and with a similar functionality, allowing
the complete recovery of the motoneuron physiology (Pastor
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FIGURE 4 | Changes in strength of different hippocampal (and related) synapses during classical eyeblink conditioning of behaving mice.
(A,B) Evolution of field excitatory post-synaptic potential (fEPSP) slopes (as % of baseline, see (A)) collected at 9 synapses, and percentage of conditioned
responses (% CRs, see (B)) across the successive training sessions. Selected synapses were: 1, perforant pathway (PP)–DG; 2, DG–CA3; 3, PP–CA3; 4, CA3–CA1;
5, contralateral CA3 (cCA3)–CA1; 6, thalamic reuniens nucleus (REU)–CA1; 7, PP–CA1; 8, CA1–subiculum (SUB); and 9, CA1–medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Note
that some synapses increased in learning-dependent strength across training (PP–DG, CA3–CA1, cCA3–CA1, REU–CA1, and CA1–SUB), whilst for others their
strengths increased at the beginning of the conditioning sessions and decreased at the end (DG–CA3, and PP–CA3). Finally, some of them did not present any
significant change (PP–CA1), or decreased across training (CA1–mPFC). See code color bars to the right of (A,B). (C) A diagram of hippocampal synapses included
in this study, indicating their main input and output connections. (D) Mean values of maximum synaptic strength across learning for the 9 synapses. According to the
statistical analyses, 4 synapses (1, 2, 4, and 8) presented maximum synaptic strengths significantly different from those evoked by synapse 9 (left histogram). Note
the potentiation of synapse 8 in contrast to the inhibition of synapse 9 during the acquisition process. A similar analysis (right histogram) showed that synapses 3, 4,
6, and 5 presented significantly different maximum synaptic strengths from those shown by synapse 7. However, synapses 1, 4, 5, and 8 presented similar synaptic
strengths at the asymptotic level (session C10, see magenta arrows) of the acquisition process. Error bars represent SEM. Taken with permission from Gruart et al.
(2015).
et al., 1997; Delgado-García and Gruart, 2004). Thus, the nervous
system is not only capable of modifying its intrinsic connectivity
in a sustained way (for learning to occur), but also of returning
to its previous state after some types of neural lesion (for
regenerative processes).
In accordance with the law of the morphological progress
(Ramón y Cajal, 1923; De Castro, 1981), neurons would add
new appendages to their terminals and would increase their
connections with other neural cells as a result of the increasing
functional adaptability. For Ramón y Cajal (at the Rome
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Meeting, 1894), these plastic phenomena are more frequent
and abundant in the cerebral cortex, in contrast to more-stable
centers (evolution-ankylosed systems) such as the brainstem
and the spinal cord. From an evolutionary perspective, it is
reasonable to think that very old neural systems with a well-
defined function are less susceptible to modification than those
appearing more recently. An example of the former is the
vestibular system, whose more-recent adaptive changes took
place a hundred million years ago (Delgado-García, 2000), while
a good example of the latter is the association cortex, very
susceptible to modification precisely because of its functional
indefinition (Gould, 1980).
To finish this section, and taking advantage of Kölliker’s
suggestions (see above), we should keep in mind that the brain
also has a tendency to compensate for unwanted changes (as
in the early stages of many neurodegenerative diseases). These
stability functions are probably more evident in the older neural
systems. For example, extraocular Mns can easily compensate
for the experimental removal of a considerable percentage of
presynaptic afferents, a phenomenon less readily observed in
cortical pyramidal cells (Delgado-García, 2011).
Ready to Depart
Although from time to time we are presented (Bullock, 1959;
Shepherd, 1972; Bennett, 2002; Bullock et al., 2005; Guillery,
2005) with (rather timid) criticisms of Ramón y Cajal’s
neuronal doctrine, the truth is that we still lack a really new
conceptual framework of brain structure and functions capable
of surpassing the preceding proposal. I should expect a big
jump from Ramón y Cajal’s arrows in a two-dimensional space
to a three- or fourth-dimensional brain analyzed during its
functional states: sleeping, dreaming, thinking, learning, and
remembering. Apart from some recent attempts (for example,
results collected using functional magnetic resonance imaging
and related techniques; Fox and Raichle, 2007; Yao et al.,
2015), the path followed was the opposite, and experimental
neuroscientists mostly preferred to move toward the inside
of the neuron (Kandel, 1998, 1999; Albright et al., 2000;
Changeux, 2001) in search of the molecules that make
possible learning, social interactions, or attentive phenomena.
In the words of Santiago Ramón y Cajal, it seems that
we are becoming followers of the religion of the small
(trivial?). Perhaps in the reasonable curiosity to find at the
lower integration level the explanation for a given functional
process, we are at risk of forgetting the search for the
origin of emergent properties emanating from the brain
in vivo.
Figure 5 illustrates an example of emergent properties rather
difficult to identify by a study of the intracellular properties
and compositions of the involved neural elements. In contrast,
the emergent resonant oscillatory property of the eyelids
was obtained from physiological recordings carried out, for
comparative purposes, in different species of mammals (Gruart
et al., 2000).
Apart from the above considerations, at the time of explaining
brain properties we are too prone to use metaphors originated
FIGURE 5 | Relationship between mean body weight and the dominant
frequency of eyelid responses for different species. Plot illustrates data
obtained from rats, guinea pigs, cats, rabbits, and humans. These data
suggest that lid biomechanics is tuned to the weight and viscoelastic
properties of the lid. Note that the slope of this relationship ( −0.25) is the
same as that characterizing heart rate and body mass (in kg) in mammals.
Taken with permission from Gruart et al. (2000).
from our scientific and cultural surroundings. For example,
Descartes imagined brain function in the light of the pneumatic
systems then available in the gardens at Versailles. Mendeleev
attempted to explain human behavior following rules obtained
from his famous periodic table. Pavlov, Freud, and Skinner
tried to describe both behavior and mental states in accordance
with their respective discoveries. Even Ramón y Cajal assumed
that interneuronal communication took place similarly to the
electrical devices (accumulators, induction coils) available in
his time, and compared neuronal connectivity to the emerging
telephonic system. We are still in a similar tessitura: ‘‘if
we ever do find some powerful generalization that applies
to brains in particular then it will probably not be about
brains as a piece of biology but about brains as computing
entities’’ (Guillery, 2005). Although it is possible that in the
near future our industrial products look as similar to us
as sons are similar to their fathers, it is evident that this
metaphoric approach (in the absence of appropriate coefficients
and quantifications) seems not very productive in themid or long
term.
Have contemporary Neuroscience feet of clay? Parodying the
title of Ramón y Cajal’s major book, the brain is a text from
which we know precisely its texture (thanks to his contributions,
as well as to those of many other neuroscientists), but we are still
incapable of understanding its semantics.
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